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Patents: Help or Hindrance to 
Technology Transfer? 
REBECCA EISENBERG 
I I Intellectual property" is a broad heading used to refer to a wide 
variety of rights associated with inventions, discoveries, writ-
ings, artistic works, product designs, and designations of the 
source of goods and services. Patents and trade secrets are the most im-
portant of these sorts of intellectual properties in the field of biotechnol-
ogy. 
One aspect of intellectual property that distinguishes it sharply from 
other forms of property-and for some people makes it harder to jus-
tify-is that intellectual properties may be possessed and used by many 
people simultaneously. This is not so for tangible property. If someone 
borrows my car, I cannot use it-nor can anyone else-until the car is 
returned to me, but if someone borrows my secret manufacturing process 
or my backup copy of my word processor, I can keep on using it while 
someone else is using it. In fact, no matter how many people I share my 
word processor with, as long as everybody can make a copy, it is not 
going to interfere with my ability to keep on using it. This capacity for 
simultaneous possession by many people is a feature that is common to 
all sorts of intellectual property, including computer programs, musical 
recordings, lists of customers, and self-replicating cell lines or genetically 
engineered organisms. Many people intuitively feel that they are doing 
nothing wrong when they make unauthorized use of intellectual property 
as, for example, when they borrow and copy other people's computer 
programs. 
What, then, justifies a system of exclusive legal rights to ideas and 
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information that others could benefit from without depriving the owners 
of their use? In the United States, intellectual property is usually justified 
in instrumental terms, although some advocates of intellectual property 
try to justify it in moral or natural-rights terms. The instrumental justifica-
tion for a patent system is that inventions and discoveries are often costly 
to make as an initial matter but cheap and easy to copy once someone else 
has made them. Because the public benefits from new inventions and 
discoveries, we want to encourage people to invest in research and devel-
opment, but they might not be willing to do so unless they have some 
means of preventing competitors from reaping the benefits of their in-
vestment without sharing in the initial risk and cost. 
SECRECY AS A WAY TO PROTECT INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 
One way of keeping inventions and discoveries out of the hands of 
competitors is to keep them secret. As long as no one else knows the 
company's formula, the company does not have to worry about competi-
tion from outsiders who did not share in the cost of developing it. How-
ever, secrecy only works for certain types of inventions, such as manufac-
turing processes, that can be exploited commercially without disclosure. 
Many inventions and discoveries are self-disclosing once you sell a prod-
uct that incorporates them. Even if secrecy is feasible, it might not be 
desirable. We might want to promote disclosure of new inventions and 
discoveries in the interest of furthering continuing technological progress 
in the field. 
PATENT PROTECTION 
An alternative to secrecy for some inventions is patent protection. A 
patent gives an inventor the right to exclude others from making, using, 
and selling the invention for a limited term: 17 years from the date the 
patent is issued under current U.S. law, 20 years from the application 
filing date in many other countries. The inventor may choose to make, 
use, and sell the patented invention; license others to do so exclusively or 
nonexclusively; or suppress the use of the invention entirely. The one 
thing the inventor cannot do is to keep the invention secret. To obtain a 
patent it is necessary to file an application that includes a full disclosure 
of the invention and of how to make it and use it. In many parts of the 
world, this disclosure is made public 18 months after the application 
filing date. In the United States it is made public as soon as the patent is 
issued. Under either system, an inventor who wants to disclose the inven-
tion earlier can do so as soon as the patent application is on file without 
jeopardizing the prospects for getting a patent. So in addition to requiring 
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disclosure, patents promote disclosure by providing a property alterna-
tive to trade secret rights that survives even after disclosure. 
Advocates of patents believe that they promote technical progress 
both by providing economic incentives to make new inventions and to 
develop them into commercial products and by promoting disclosure of 
new inventions to the public. The extent to which the present patent 
system achieves these goals is not known. Few people would argue that 
invention and technical disclosure would come to a standstill in the ab-
sence of a patent system. Firms that introduce new technologies into the 
market might find some research and development profitable even with-
out patent rights. The lead-time advantage over competitors gained by 
being first in the market with an innovation, for example, might be enough 
to justify continued expenditures on research and development. 
COSTS OF THE PATENT SYSTEM 
The prospect of obtaining patent rights undoubtedly increases incen-
tives to invest in research and development, at least in some fields, but the 
social costs associated with having a patent system have to be weighed 
against these benefits. The most obvious social cost associated with pat-
ents is that they create monopolies that increase the price and reduce the 
supply of products that are covered by patents. This may be a tolerable 
cost for socially useful inventions that would not have been made without 
the incentives of the patent system-we might choose to have these in-
ventions at a high price rather than not to have them at all, but it is a high 
price to pay for inventions that would have been developed even without 
patent rights. 
It is therefore important to formulate rules of patent law that exclude 
from protection inventions that would have been made even without the 
added incentive of the patent system. Most patent systems attempt to do 
this by requiring that an invention have a certain level of importance 
before it can be patented. In the United States we require that an inven-
tion be new, useful, and nonobvious to be patented. The nonobviousness 
requirement is a mechanism for distinguishing between inventions that 
would come about without the patent system and those that need its 
added incentive. These rules are very difficult to administer and result in 
a lot of uncertainty in the patent system. 
Patent systems also entail considerable administrative costs. These 
include the costs of determining which inventions are patentable, an ac-
tivity that consumes the time and energy of technically trained people 
who might otherwise be adding to the knowledge base more directly. 
Patent applications also incur costs in procuring and enforcing patents, 
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and their competitors incur costs in avoiding infringement (including the 
costs of research efforts aimed at inventing around patented inventions). 
Patents may also inhibit inventive activity of people other than the 
patent holders in fields that are dominated by patents. Patents may dis-
tort social priorities by diverting resources toward invention and away 
from other social problems. They may distort research in favor of making 
patentable inventions and away from areas in which patent protection is 
not available, such as basic research or discoveries in fields that are ex-
cluded from patent protection but might nonetheless be socially benefi-
cial. 
THE PATENT SYSTEM IN BIOTECHNOLOGY 
These costs of the patent system should be remembered when consid-
ering the role of patents in biotechnology, particularly the role of patents 
in publicly funded biotechnology such as the Human Genome Project 
(Eisenberg 1994a,b). The Human Genome Project is an interesting ex-
ample because it involves extensive government funding directed toward 
generating vast amounts of information in the hope that that information 
will ultimately be put to use in developing new products and processes 
for the diagnosis and treatment of human disease. Much of this informa-
tion is generated in government and university laboratories that are not in 
a position to undertake the research and development necessary further 
downstream to translate basic research discoveries into commercial prod-
ucts. 
PATENTING AS A WAY TO PROMOTE 
TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER 
Technology transfer to the private sector is a prerequisite for the de-
velopment of genome-related products, but how to achieve technology 
transfer in such a project is a complex matter. U.S. policy since 1980 has 
reflected an increasingly confident presumption that patenting discover-
ies made in government-sponsored research is the most effective way to 
promote technology transfer and commercial development of those dis-
coveries in the private sector. Policy makers of prior generations may 
have thought that the best way to achieve widespread use of the results of 
government-sponsored research was to make them freely available to the 
public. Advocates of the new patenting strategy stress the need for exclu-
sive rights as an incentive for industry to undertake the further costly 
investment necessary to bring new products to market. 
This new strategy is justified in terms of both trade policy and tech-
nology policy. The trade policy argument is that although the United 
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States leads the world in basic research and the creation of new technolo-
gies, other nations do a better job of commercializing and adopting new 
technologies in the private sector. As a result, U.S. firms lose sales to 
foreign manufacturers of goods that are based on technologies pioneered 
in the United States. The competitiveness of U.S. firms in world markets 
might be enhanced by leveraging U.S. strengths in research into a stron-
ger position of dominance in applied technology. 
The technology policy argument is that government-sponsored basic 
research discoveries that have been left in the public domain have not 
been picked up by the private sector and developed into commercial 
products, or at least not at the rate that one would hope to see. If the 
economy needs a steady infusion of new technologies to grow and to 
improve worker productivity, many argue that we need to induce the 
private sector to tap into the wealth of new information emerging from 
government and university research. This rationale presumes that inven-
tions made freely available are languishing in government and university 
archives rather than being actively exploited by all. 
NEW PATENT POLICY OF THE 1980s 
The solution to these twin concerns, in keeping with the privatization 
ethos of the 1980s, was to offer up the results of government-sponsored 
research for private appropriation by U.S. industry through the mecha-
nism of licenses under government- and university-owned patents. Ex-
clusive patent licenses from a government agency or university would 
make it profitable for U.S. industry to develop products that would be too 
risky or costly to pursue if the discoveries were left in the public domain 
and competitors were therefore free to enter the market once it was estab-
lished. Technology transfer facilitated by patent rights would generate 
new products for U.S. consumers and create jobs for U.S. workers while 
protecting U.S. firms from foreign competition. 
Curiously, although the primary motive behind this patent policy 
appears to have been a desire to benefit U.S. industry, the primary impe-
tus to get it enacted into law seems to have come from the government, 
with the support of universities, rather than from the private sector. Al-
though industry has been slow to go for the bait of patent licenses to 
government-sponsored research discoveries, the government has not wa-
vered from the patenting strategy but has instead fortified it by extending 
it to cover more discoveries made in a wider range of research settings. 
Starting in 1980 the presumption in favor of patenting research dis-
coveries was applied to small business and nonprofit organizations mak-
ing research discoveries with federal funding under the Bayh-Dole Act. In 
1983 these provisions were extended by a Presidential memorandum to 
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large businesses doing government-sponsored research. They were ex-
tended by statutory amendments to discoveries made at government-
owned, contractor-operated facilities in 1984, then to intramural research 
and research performed under agreements between government agencies 
and the private sector under the Federal Technology Transfer Act of 1986. 
Subsequent legislation and executive orders have continued to broaden 
and fortify this policy. 
Today we have a system that virtually guarantees that wherever fed-
erally sponsored inventions are made-whether in government, univer-
sity, or private laboratories-anyone involved in the research project who 
wants the discovery to be patented may prevail over the objection of 
anyone who thinks the discovery should be placed in the public domain. 
Thus, for example, if a university is reluctant to patent a discovery made 
in its laboratories with federal funds, the sponsoring agency may insist on 
obtaining a patent. If a government agency or university has no interest in 
pursuing a patent, the investigator who made the discovery may step in 
and claim patent rights. If anyone sees money to be made through patent-
ing a government-sponsored research discovery and has the resources 
and sophistication to pursue patent rights, chances are it will be patented. 
QUESTIONING FEDERAL PATENT POLICY 
Now all of this makes sense if we want all government-sponsored 
research discoveries to be patented. But do we? Since 1980 federal patent 
policy has assumed that discoveries left in the public domain will not be 
used and that granting exclusive rights to discoveries to businesses will 
ensure their commercial exploitation for the benefit of consumers, taxpay-
ers, and the economy. Our present statutes come close to reflecting a 
conclusive presumption that this is so. But is it so in fact? 
The answer probably will vary from one field to the next and from 
one discovery to the next. The strong pro-patent tilt of current policy 
seems like a vast oversimplification of the enormously complex task of 
achieving technology transfer across the broad spectrum of discoveries 
emanating from federally sponsored research. 
One reason for the complexity is that technology transfer requires 
extensive back-and-forth communication among different types of insti-
tutions and among researchers and technology users who speak to each 
other across significant cultural divides. The extent of this problem varies 
among fields. In some fields, researchers in government and university 
labs share norms of openness that conflict with commercial interests in 
secrecy. Patent rights may sometimes reduce this difficulty by providing 
intellectual property rights that survive disclosure. At other times, con-
cerns about preserving the ability to patent future discoveries might for-
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tify commercial incentives to maintain secrecy and thereby aggravate the 
conflict between the cultures of academic research science and industry. 
Any policy that promotes widespread patenting of the results of govern-
ment-sponsored research would thus need to take into account and man-
age the effect of patents on the research enterprise. 
Even setting aside the culture of academic research and focusing ex-
clusively on the perspective of industry, current policy seems to oversim-
plify a complex problem. Patents may make sense as a means of facilitat-
ing technology transfer for some government-sponsored discoveries, but 
there are reasons to suspect that they make little sense for others. The 
course of scientific discovery and product development is infinitely com-
plex, variable, and unpredictable. Uniformity in technology transfer policy 
may therefore be a false ideal. Neither the old-fashioned approach of 
leaving all new discoveries in the public domain nor the newer approach 
of assigning exclusive rights in such discoveries to private parties should 
be uniformly applied across the entire range of publicly supported dis-
coveries. In our eagerness to avoid the inadequacies of the public domain 
approach, we may have moved too quickly and too emphatically in the 
opposite direction to the point where patent rights in some government-
sponsored discoveries may actually be undermining rather than support-
ing incentives to develop new products and bring them to market. 
NIH APPLICATIONS FOR eDNA PATENTS 
One sign of trouble in paradise for federal technology transfer policy 
was the reaction of industry trade groups a few years ago to the filing of 
patent applications by the National Institutes of Health (NIH) on thou-
sands of partial eDNA sequences of unknown function identified in gov-
ernment laboratories (Eisenberg, 1992). The research that led to the con-
troversial patent applications consisted of taking randomly selected 
cDNAs from a human brain tissue eDNA library and finding the DNA 
sequence for small portions of those genes without knowing what pro-
teins or functions are associated with the genes. Beginning in the summer 
of 1991, NIH filed patent applications claiming the partial eDNA se-
quences as well as the full genes of which they are a part, which NIH 
claimed could be readily obtained with the partial sequence information. 
An avowed purpose of seeking these patent rights was to be able to offer 
licenses to firms to promote the development of products related to the 
sequences. 
Some of these patent applications were rejected by the U.S. Patent 
and Trademark Office, and the new leadership of NIH decided not to 
appeal the rejections and to withdraw the remaining claims. Although the 
immediate controversy was thereby resolved, it is nonetheless worth-
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while to reflect upon this controversy as a case study of the role of patents 
in technology transfer. These patent applications generated considerable 
controversy among scientists throughout the world who charged that the 
human genome represents the universal heritage of humanity and should 
be dedicated to the public domain. They argued that intellectual property 
rights could undermine scientific collaborations and thereby retard 
progress in the Human Genome Project. Much of the controversy within 
the scientific community has been a reprise of an old debate about the 
effect of intellectual property rights on research science norms. 
What was striking about this controversy was that the patent applica-
tions were also opposed by trade groups from the industry that NIH 
intended to benefit through technology transfer. These trade groups are 
not composed of naive, idealistic scientists who have limited experience 
with patents and limited interest in product development. Their members 
are the same hard-nosed, profit-maximizing firms that the government is 
trying to entice into developing products out of government-sponsored 
inventions. Position statements from the Pharmaceutical Manufacturers 
Association and from two biotechnology trade groups that have since 
merged, the Industrial Biotechnology Association and the Association of 
Biotechnology Companies, expressed views on the NIH patent applica-
tions that contradict the hypothesis that patent protection for those par-
ticular discoveries was necessary to protect the interests of firms that 
might develop related products in the future. 
The Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association and the Industrial 
Biotechnology Association urged that NIH not seek patent protection on 
DNA sequences with unknown biological function but instead place such 
sequences in the public domain. The third group, the Association of Bio-
technology Companies, supported the NIH decision to seek patent pro-
tection, but only as a means of generating revenues for the government 
and not as a means of ensuring the availability of exclusive rights to those 
sequences. Indeed, even the Association of Biotechnology Companies 
urged that the patents be licensed on a nonexclusive basis so as not to 
block development projects in industry. So although this position is nomi-
nally consistent with current federal patent policy, it contradicts its un-
derlying rationale by conceding that, at least in this particular case, exclu-
sive rights to the discoveries could interfere with their effective 
commercial development. 
INDUSTRY OPPOSITION TO NIH PATENTING eDNA 
Why might U.S. industry object to NIH's pursuit of these patent rights 
and what does that tell us about the role of patents in technology transfer? 
First, an easy explanation is that the firms may not want NIH to be in a 
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position to grant or deny licenses to develop genome-related products. 
There is an essential irony in using government-owned patents to achieve 
technology transfer. This strategy places a government agency in a licens-
ing role for the purpose of promoting privatization. If NIH holds patent 
rights to a significant portion of the human genome, it may use its posi-
tion as licensor to regulate the development of genome-related products, 
which is the last thing that industry wants. 
Exclusive licenses under NIH patents until recently included reason-
able-pricing clauses that permit NIH to monitor the reasonableness of 
prices charged for licensed products. Exclusive and nonexclusive NIH 
licenses include domestic manufacturing clauses requiring the licensee to 
manufacture products in the United States or at least granting a prefer-
ence for U.S. manufacture. Such provisions tie the hands of industry and 
limit the profitability of products developed even under an exclusive 
patent license. 
Firms may be particularly wary of NIH as a licensor in view of its 
recent role in authorizing a generic drug manufacturer to pursue NIH's 
claim against Burroughs Wellcome to patent rights in the use of the drug 
azidothymidine (AZT) in the treatment of acquired immune deficiency 
syndrome. This episode highlights the ambivalence of NIH toward profit 
maximization in the marketing of health-related products. 
Second, the patent rights that NIH sought may have seemed unneces-
sary as a means of protecting the profit expectations of industry. The 
current government patent policy is based on a simple model of technol-
ogy transfer in which a patent on a government-sponsored invention is 
the only source of exclusivity on the horizon for firms seeking to develop 
related commercial products. However, commercial products in indus-
tries that make use of patents, such as the pharmaceutical industry, typi-
cally embody multiple patented inventions. If a firm has its own patent 
rights in a product that are adequate to protect its market position, NIH 
patent rights covering the same product or covering inventions that are 
necessary to develop or market the product may be nothing more than an 
annoyance to the firm. If government patents are not only unnecessary to 
provide market exclusivity, but also come with burdensome restrictions 
on pricing and place of manufacture, firms may see them more as a regu-
latory hurdle than as an incentive to innovation. 
Third, NIH patents may have seemed ineffective in protecting the 
market position of innovating firms. Patent rights are most likely to be 
effective in promoting product development when they ensure the patent 
holder of a commercially effective monopoly in the relevant product mar-
ket. Whether NIH patents would have had this effect depends on the 
scope of patent rights NIH had been able to obtain from the Patent and 
Trademark Office. Generally, the most effective commercial protection, 
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and therefore the most powerful incentive to invest in product develop-
ment, is provided by a patent on an end product that is sold to consumers. 
Partial eDNA sequences of unknown function may tum out to be market-
able as end products-perhaps in a diagnostic product-but it is more 
likely that they will be useful as research tools to find the full-length 
genes to which they correspond and to make the products for which those 
genes code. 
The NIH patent applications included claims to these full-length genes 
on the theory that, by disclosing how to use the partial sequences as 
probes to find the full genes, NIH had provided an enabling disclosure of 
how to make those full genes. Although the NIH patent application did 
not disclose either the complete DNA sequence for the genes or the pro-
teins for which they code, it did provide a general description of how to 
use the partial sequences as probes to find the full genes and how to 
achieve expression of the gene products once the full genes have been 
found. But under recent court decisions it is unlikely that NIH would 
have been able to obtain patents on the full genes without setting forth 
their full sequences (see, e.g., Fiers v. Sugano, 984 F.2d 1164 [Fed. Cir., 
1993]). Thus, NIH patent rights would probably have been limited to 
narrower claims to the specific partial eDNA sequences than are actually 
set forth in the applications. Such limited patent rights would probably 
not have been broad enough to give effective commercial protection to 
firms seeking to bring related products to market, and the argument for 
obtaining patents as a means of promoting product development would 
lose its force. 
PATENTS ON RESEARCH TOOLS 
The partial eDNA sequences themselves are primarily useful as tools 
for research and development. Not only is it difficult to detect and prove 
infringements of such patents, but often the only effective remedy even 
for proven infringement will be damages, because an injunction against 
future use of the invention at that stage would not thwart the efforts of a 
competitor who has already finished using the invention. One could ar-
gue for a substantial damage remedy, but as long as the competitor no 
longer needs to use the patented invention in the manufacturing stage, an 
injunction against future infringement would not serve to keep the com-
petitor off the market. Firms that are interested in developing end prod-
ucts for sale to consumers are unlikely to see patents on research tools 
used only during research and development as an effective means of 
promoting their market exclusivity in the ultimate products. Such patents 
may generate royalty income for their owners, and the prospect of earn-
ing royalties may make it more profitable to develop further research 
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tools in the private sector. However, it is unlikely to enhance the incen-
tives of firms to develop end products through the use of those research 
tools. 
I think there are reasons to be wary of patents on research tools apart 
from their ineffectiveness in promoting product development. Negotiat-
ing licenses for access to research tools may present particularly difficult 
problems for would-be licensees who might not want to disclose the di-
rections of their research in its early stages by requesting a license. More-
over, a significant research project might require access to many research 
tools. If each of these tools required a separate license and royalty pay-
ment, the costs and administrative burden could mount quickly. 
Patent holders, moreover, may find it more lucrative to license re-
search-tool patents on an exclusive rather than nonexclusive basis and in 
the process choke off other firms' research and development. For years 
this country has sustained a flourishing biomedical research enterprise in 
which investigators have drawn heavily on discoveries that their prede-
cessors left in the public domain. Even if exclusive rights enhance private 
incentives to develop further research tools, they could do considerable 
damage to the research enterprise by inhibiting the effective use of exist-
ing tools. Patents on research tools may offer ineffective commercial pro-
tection to firms that use the tools to develop new products for consumers 
while interfering with research and development within those firms. 
The more research that remains to be done to develop a product, the 
more likely it is that the innovating firm will make further patentable 
inventions of its own. These subsequent inventions are more likely to be 
incorporated in the final product, and patents on such inventions are thus 
likely to be far more important to the firm's profit expectations than ex-
clusive access to any particular research tool. 
CONCLUSION 
The present policy of promoting patents on federally sponsored in-
ventions has become rapidly entrenched in U.S. law, although it is not 
clear that this policy always serves its underlying agenda of furthering 
the transfer of new technologies to the private sector for commercial de-
velopment. Patents undoubtedly have a critical role to play in facilitating 
technology transfer in some contexts, but they can also interfere with 
technology transfer and with the broader goal of promoting continuing 
technological process. These goals may sometimes be served by allocating 
new information to the public domain. Government is uniquely situated 
to enrich the public domain, and we should be wary of disabling the 
government from performing this critical function in our eagerness to 
enhance private incentives to put existing discoveries to use. 
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